In domain after domain—in the Black Sea, in the air, in cyberspace, in the informational domain, and increasingly on land—Russia has been forced into a position where it cannot use its superior assets to deliver results. Each instance of a domain-specific functional defeat degrades Russia’s campaign and weakens its strategic leverage. The goal is to expand and replicate these effects, ensuring that Russia’s presence, though intact, yields no strategic gain.

In this zone, Russian forces face constant surveillance and rapid targeting, making it nearly impossible for them to move equipment, resupply forward units, or even reposition small infantry elements without being struck. The result is not the total defeat of Russian ground forces but the functional disablement of traditional land warfare doctrines. Classic operational ground forces warfighting methods, including massed firepower or Russian-style human wave attacks, no longer produce results in such an environment.

From the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion—and even earlier, with the occupation of Crimea and parts of the Black Sea in 2014—Moscow has treated control of Ukraine’s maritime access as a central strategic objective. By cutting off Ukraine from the sea, Russia sought to suffocate the Ukrainian economy and build the foundations for a wider territorial conquest along the Black Sea coast. The occupation of Snake Island on the first day of the war in 2022, attacks on Mykolaiv, and the planned assault on Odesa all reflect the importance Russia placed on this objective. Because strategic neutralization does not require full liberation or formal resolution, it enables Ukraine and its partners to act asymmetrically and sustainably. It is a strategy of smart pressure and long-game resilience, not frontal sacrifice.

  • This strategy is already materializing in multiple domains, where Ukraine has delivered what one senior U.K.
  • The scale and pace of change suggest there is a new military-technical revolution underway, one that could reshape the character of war more profoundly than previous shifts in military history.
  • „While I love many things in the bill, promising someone else will cut spending in the future does not cut spending,“ Davidson said on X.
  • Trump helped Johnson and GOP leaders close the deal, joining a House Republican Conference meeting at the Capitol on Tuesday.
  • Strategic neutralization works not only on the battlefield but also in the minds of Russian elites and security institutions.

By ensuring that Russia’s war is operationally pointless, Ukraine can survive, adapt, and achieve success, no matter how prolonged the war. At Victory Programs, we value your time, both at work and in your personal life, ensuring you have the resources and support you need to thrive. Victory Programs operates various programs throughout Boston, all built on our strongly held belief that no person who is struggling should be asked to do the hardest thing first, on their own, before they are offered the fundamental support they truly need. „While I love many things in the bill, promising someone else will cut spending in the future does not cut spending,“ Davidson said on X. Both Johnson and Majority Leader Steve Scalise, R-La., returned from the meeting vowing to charge ahead with a vote, even without public assurances from the Freedom Caucus. The leaders were desperate to move quickly because they feared there could be GOP absences later in the week.

Recovery

In addition to its hailed drone production, Ukraine reports that it produces more howitzers and artillery systems than all of Europe combined. The Ukrainians know exactly what they need and are constantly tweaking their hardware to conditions on the battlefield. They also have an urban farming program that helps provide food sufficiency and purpose for the communities they serve, which in turn helps prevent many from falling into a pattern of substance misuse. The group also s advocates for mental health, wellness, and education, all of which are important for improving the long-term success of rehab programs in the area, including those run by other organizations.

How the Israel-Iran War Might End

Trump helped Johnson and GOP leaders close the deal, joining a House Republican Conference meeting at the Capitol on Tuesday. When Harris and other conservatives dug in further Wednesday, Trump called them and GOP leaders down to the White House to get them on board. Overall, the package is set to decrease household resources among the lowest decile, or tenth, of income earners by 4% and increase household resources among the highest decile of income earners by 2% by 2033.

A Model from the Sea: Russia’s Functional Defeat in the Maritime Domain

The sweeping package included a series of last-minute changes to appease factions of GOP holdouts whose votes are essential in the slim House majority. Republicans can spare only three GOP defections on any vote in the face of unified Democratic opposition. Republicans and Democrats sparred over the legislation during a marathon House Rules Committee hearing that began just after 1 a.m. ET Wednesday and wrapped 21 hours later, when the committee Victory Programs Review sent the bill to the floor. „Now, it’s time for our friends in the United States Senate to get to work, and send this Bill to my desk AS SOON AS POSSIBLE! There is no time to waste,“ Trump said on Truth Social.

For many, Victory Programs represents the last possibility for hope and the first chance for sustained success in their battles with substance use or illness. Victory Programs Inc. is a collection of affiliated substance use recovery and mental health programs based in the Greater Boston Area. It has been serving the region for over 40 years, focusing on women and children, groups that have been underserved in terms of access to psychiatric care. However, the doors of this facility are open to all who need care for substance use disorder. Strategic neutralization is not a peace plan but a strategy for sustained resistance and long-term success under conditions of permanent hostility. It offers a way to survive, adapt, and prevail without illusions—by ensuring that Russia’s war, no matter how prolonged, remains operationally pointless.

It launched a campaign using surface drones, precision missiles, and air-launched strikes to degrade the Russian Black Sea Fleet and put at risk Russia’s commercial shipping. The outcome was not total naval destruction but something strategically more profound. By 2024, Russia had been forced to withdraw most of its naval assets to the eastern Black Sea, effectively ceding control of western waters. Ukraine successfully reopened maritime trade routes, and commercial traffic returned to prewar levels—without Russian approval, negotiation, or concession.

House the person

Ukraine’s advantage lies in its people—including an agile and creative tech sector that has already turned the country into a hub for battlefield innovation—as well as in the support and technical expertise of its international partners. Capitalizing on this opportunity will require the right policies, targeted investments, and an industrial strategy designed not only to survive, but also to win, a contest of innovation at scale. Instead of relying on naval parity, Ukraine adopted a creative, asymmetric approach.

  • Trump has consistently signaled that, at the very least, military aid resembling anything close to that the Biden administration bankrolled would not be forthcoming.
  • For many, Victory Programs represents the last possibility for hope and the first chance for sustained success in their battles with substance use or illness.
  • From the opening moments of the invasion, Russia intended to assert aerospace dominance as a foundation for its strategic offensive.
  • It is challenging to demonstrate a functional defeat in the air domain when Ukraine continues to endure record-breaking waves of missile and drone attacks and its front lines face daily strikes from Russian glide bombs.

As long as the Ukrainians’ determination to fight on is undiminished, there are strategies available to help them win—even without U.S. support at the levels to which they have become accustomed. Recent expectations—particularly in Washington—that a ceasefire could soon be negotiated have proven premature, if not an outright miscalculation. Many Western policymakers have constructed a long-term strategy for Ukraine based on an assumption that, once hostilities end, it can be fortified through a combination of indigenous production and targeted external support to deter renewed aggression. A client-driven service dedicated to supporting the needs of individuals living with HIV who need assistance accessing community resources. Our services range from recovery support groups like AA or Refuge Recovery to wellness and life-skill activities like resume-building workshops or yoga classes; anything that encompasses healthy and safe choices for the mind, body, and soul. “Sometimes I feel so happy that my heart — I feel like I’m having like a big, good pain in my heart,” she said.

In that scenario, Ukraine’s military and political continuity would have been in jeopardy. It is challenging to demonstrate a functional defeat in the air domain when Ukraine continues to endure record-breaking waves of missile and drone attacks and its front lines face daily strikes from Russian glide bombs. Among all domains, air remains the most dangerous, and Ukraine’s air defense network—though resilient—is under constant strain because of limited capacity and escalating demand. Yet the present situation, as damaging as it is, is fundamentally different from what might have occurred had Russia succeeded in establishing air dominance in the first days of the war. For every billion that the United States has paid out to its own industry, the Europeans can get several times as much from the Ukrainians—and without the same transfer headaches and costs.

Low-Threshold Housing

The Ukrainians—and Europe can thank them for it—are showing a resourcefulness and resilience that earns them the West’s support. If the United States is not going to be there for them, then Europe must—and it can. In March, the program that was originally titled ReArm Europe was recast as European Readiness 2030, with the aspiration to leverage 800 billion euros ($912 billion) for defense spending over five years.

This means Ukraine’s defense institutions must commit to rapid, wartime adaptation—even amid daily pressures and resource constraints. At its core, strategic neutralization seeks to create cross-domain operational paralysis. Russia may continue to fight, but its forces will fail to achieve their objectives, and its strategic capabilities will be systematically disrupted.

Contact Victory Programs Inc. by visiting today and learn about the available treatment options. Ukraine and its allies must confront the reality that traditional definitions of endgame may also no longer apply. For example, the JPMorganChase Center for Geopolitics in May 2025 put the odds of a South Korea–style armistice scenario at just 15 percent, reflecting how unlikely a formal cessation of hostilities is under current conditions. Given the Kremlin’s maximalist goals, domestic control, and ideological framing of the war, it is possible the conflict may not technically end at all, at least not while the current Russian regime remains in power. Russia’s war against Ukraine has entered a new phase, defined not by momentum or negotiation but by strategic deadlock and ideological persistence.

WASHINGTON — The House narrowly passed a massive domestic policy package Thursday morning, a major victory for President Donald Trump and Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., after weeks of heated intraparty negotiations and some last-minute changes. In March, for example, Merz—then the incoming German chancellor—created a 500 billion euro ($570 billion) debt pool for defense expenditures and German infrastructure. And Norway, both part of the “coalition of the willing” that was launched by France and the U.K. After the Munich Security Conference in February—pledged an additional 450 million British pounds (about $600 million) of military support to Kyiv. U.S. policymakers—among them a majority of Republicans—realize that there is too much for Washington to lose from a potential Ukrainian collapse. The United States can, and probably will, extend offers similar to previous support where it doesn’t cost Washington excessively.

The air domain remains highly contested, and Ukraine’s ability to maintain this denial depends on continued external support, especially advanced Western systems. As in other domains, functional defeat in the air will never be permanent—it must be actively sustained through continued adaptation, innovation, scaling, and supply. Under such circumstances, a revised theory of victory must be grounded in realism rather than closure. Victory for Ukraine may not come through peace negotiations or battlefield capitulation but through the construction of a resilient, secure, and thriving state under permanent threat. This means normalizing national life, rebuilding the economy, maintaining a viable defense posture, and ensuring that Russia’s attempts to disrupt Ukrainian sovereignty are strategically ineffective.